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I. Introduction
The modeling of default is instrumental in determining
the values of corporate securities and the firm’s fi-
nancing decisions since it affects firm value and its
sharing among claimholders. Because of the limited
liability principle, default is the shareholders’ decision
and can be endogenized by identifying the default pol-
icy that maximizes equity value. This point, first made
by Black and Cox (1976), is developed in more recent
works by Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland (1994),
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), and Morellec (2001).
In most of these models, default leads to an immediate
liquidation of the firm’s assets. In practice, however, a
firm in financial distress can either liquidate its assets
under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or try
to renegotiate outstanding debt in terms that are more
affordable.
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We examine the impact
of the U.S. bankruptcy
procedure on the valua-
tion of corporate securi-
ties and capital structure
decisions. We provide
closed-form solutions for
corporate debt and equity
values when defaulting
firms can either liquidate
their assets or renegotiate
outstanding debt under
court protection. We
show that the possibility
to renegotiate the debt
contract (i) has an ambig-
uous impact on leverage
choices and (ii) increases
credit spreads on corpo-
rate debt. The sharing
rule of cash flows during
bankruptcy has a large
impact on optimal lever-
age. By contrast, credit
spreads on corporate debt
show little sensitivity to
this very parameter.
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The possibility of out-of-court renegotiations has been recognized by a
stream of models, including those of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-
Barral and Perraudin (1997), and Fan and Sundaresan (2000). These papers
incorporate, under the assumption of costless renegotiation, debt reliefs granted
to firms in financial distress. Since liquidation is costly and bondholders bear
liquidation costs, there is room for strategic default, that is, situations in which
the firm pays less than the contractual debt service. Strategic default occurs
each time the state variable—typically the value of the firm’s assets—falls
below some endogenous default threshold. In a rational expectations model,
bondholders anticipate the opportunistic behavior of shareholders and reflect
the associated wealth extraction in the pricing of corporate debt.
While contingent claims models of out-of-court renegotiations provide a
useful framework to analyze private workouts, their applicability to court-
supervised debt renegotiation is more limited. Indeed, renegotiations under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code differ from private workouts in a
number of dimensions that affect the renegotiation process and, hence, the
values of corporate securities. To our knowledge the only two contingent
claims models that analyze the impact of Chapter 11 on debt values are those
by Franks and Torous (1989) and Longstaff (1990). These both model Chapter
11 as the right to extend (once) the maturity date of the debt (a zero-coupon
bond). The longer this extension privilege, the more valuable it is to share-
holders and hence the larger the credit spread on corporate debt. Unfortunately,
these articles do not analyze optimal leverage nor the decision to go bankrupt.
This article analyzes the impact of Chapter 11 on asset prices, capital
structure choices, and the decision to default. For so doing, the framework
we develop captures the following features of the U.S. bankruptcy procedure
(see White 1996):
1. Bankruptcy filings can be initiated either voluntarily by managers or
involuntarily by creditors. However, the U.S. bankruptcy law dis-
courages involuntary filings by leaving the choice of the chapter fil-
ing—liquidation under Chapter 7 or reorganization under Chapter
11—to the manager.
2. Bankruptcy filings under Chapter 11 imply the automatic stay of assets
that prevents bondholders from appropriating firm value by liquidating
the firm’s assets; Chapter 11 also imposes time and cost constraints
on the renegotiation process.
3. The bankruptcy filing provides the defaulting firm with an observation
period (also known as the exclusivity period) during which the court
guarantees its survival; at the end of the observation period, the court
decides whether the firm continues as a going concern or not.
Section II presents the valuation framework. In our setting, default can lead
either to liquidation of the firm’s assets or to renegotiation of the debt contract.
In bankruptcy, the firm incurs costs of financial distress, and the cash flows
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it generates are shared among claimholders. Moreover, for firms that choose
to renegotiate their claims under the court’s protection, the default date is the
starting point of a period during which the parties involved in the process
(the claimholders and the court) observe the evolution of the value of the
firm’s assets. The firm emerges from financial distress if the value of its assets
shows signs of recovery during the observation period. Otherwise, liquidation
is pronounced at the end of the period.
In Section III we analyze the main implications of the model for asset prices
and capital structure decisions. We show that the possibility to file for Chapter
11 and to renegotiate debt contracts has an ambiguous effect on firms’ leverage
choices. By contrast, the impact of debt renegotiation on shareholders’ default
incentives and credit spreads is unambiguous. Specifically, debt renegotiation
encourages early default and increases credit spreads on corporate debt. More-
over, both the time and costs constraints associated with the renegotiation
process affect the magnitude of these effects. The analysis in this article also
reveals that the quantitative impact of claimholders’ bargaining power on
corporate financing decisions is important. By contrast, credit spreads on
corporate debt show little sensitivity to this very parameter.
II. Chapter 11 and Asset Prices
This section presents the valuation framework. In order to emphasize the
effects of Chapter 11 on asset prices and capital structure decisions, we take
as benchmarks the models developed by Leland (1994) and Fan and Sun-
daresan (2000). Consequently, the model relies on the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Assets are continuously traded in arbitrage-free and com-
plete markets.
Assumption 2. The default-free term structure is flat with an instanta-
neous riskless rate r, at which investors may lend and borrow freely.
Assumption 3. Management acts in the best interests of shareholders.
Assumption 4. The firm has issued perpetual debt with contractual cou-
pon payment c.1
Assumption 5. Corporate taxes are paid at a rate t, and full offsets of
corporate losses are allowed.2
Assumption 6. Upon liquidation, the firm incurs costs that represent a
proportion a of the value of remaining assets. The proceeds from liquidation
are distributed according to absolute priority.
Assumption 7. The value of the firm’s assets is independent of(V)t t≥0
capital structure choices and is governed, under the risk-neutral measure Q,
1. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) propose a model where leverage follows an exog-
enous mean-reverting process. Goldstein et al. (2001) analyze endogenous leverage changes.
2. The tax shield provided by debt financing is the only motive for issuing debt in the present
model. Morellec (2004) develops a model of leverage choices where debt financing also increases
firm value by constraining management’s choice of an investment policy.
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by the process
dVp (r d)Vdt jVdW . (1)t t t t
In equation (1), d is the firm’s payout rate, j is the constant volatility of asset
returns, and is a standard Brownian motion defined on the probability(W )t t≥0
space .(Q,F, Q)
Although the firm may operate its assets forever, it can also choose to
default on its debt obligations. Within our framework, default leads either to
liquidation of the firm’s assets (under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code)
or to renegotiation of the debt contract. While firms can renegotiate their debt
privately, we focus hereafter on Chapter 11 filings, that is, court-supervised
debt renegotiation. (We show below that our model encompasses those of
Leland [1994] and Fan and Sundaresan [2000], which apply, respectively, to
Chapter 7 filings and private workouts.)
Chapter 11 differs from Chapter 7 and private workouts in a number of
dimensions that affect shareholders’ incentives to default and, hence, the val-
ues of corporate securities. Key among these differences is the treatment of
claimholders in default. When default leads to a Chapter 7 filing, the firm’s
assets are liquidated, and no renegotiation is possible. By contrast, private
workouts allow claimholders to renegotiate their claims after default without
any time constraint. Chapter 11 filings typically lie in between these two
alternatives. Upon default, the court grants the firm a period of observation
during which the firm can renegotiate its claims. At the end of this period,
the court decides whether the firm continues as a going concern or not.
Empirical studies show that most firms emerge from Chapter 11. Only a
few firms (5%, according to Gilson, John, and Lang [1990] and Weiss [1990]),
and between 15% and 25%, according to Morse and Shaw [1988]) are even-
tually liquidated under Chapter 7 after filing Chapter 11. Why do some firms
recover while some others do not? It is generally acknowledged (see Wruck
1990 or White 1996) that there exist two types of defaulting firms. First, firms
that are economically sound promptly recover under Chapter 11. Default was
only due to a temporary financial distress. Second, firms that are economically
unsound keep on losing value under Chapter 11. Their financial indicators
remain in the red. In that same spirit, we assume hereafter that the firm is
liquidated only if the value of its assets reaches a level —indicative ofVB
financial distress—and remains below that same level for a time interval larger
than the period of observation. This specification for default and liquidation
implies that firms emerging from Chapter 11 do not bear real economic costs
(see Maksimovic and Phillips [1998] for empirical evidence). It also captures
the fact that a large proportion of firms that emerge from Chapter 11 reenter
bankruptcy in the following years (see, e.g., Hotchkiss 1995 or Gilson 1997).
In order to determine the value of corporate securities in this setting, we
define the following random variables:
VBg p sup {s ≤ t : V p V }, (2)t s B
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Fig. 1.—The liquidation criterion
V VB Bv p inf {t ≥ 0 : (t g ) ≥ d, V ≤ V }, (3)t t B
where is the last time before t that the value of the firm’s assets reachesVBgt
the default threshold and is the liquidation time, that is, the first time theVBv
value of the firm’s assets has spent d units of time consecutively below the
default threshold. Figure 1 illustrates our modeling of the liquidation date. In
our setup, shareholders hold a Parisian down-and-out call option on the firm’s
assets. That is, shareholders have a residual claim on the cash flows generated
by the firm’s assets unless the value of these assets reaches the default threshold
and remains below that threshold for the exclusivity period.3
We assume in what follows that claimholders anticipate the same length d
of the observation period, reflecting the balance of power between the court,
the manager, and claimholders. The following examples are of special interest
since they pertain to previous contributions of the literature.
Example 1. When , default leads to an immediate liquidation anddp 0
the liquidation date is described by the first passage time of the stateVBT
variable to VB: . Thus when , we get as aVBT p inf {t ≥ 0 : Vp V } dp 0t B
special case the standard modeling of default and liquidation (see Leland
1994).
Example 2. When , default never leads to liquidation, and wed r 
get as a special case the standard modeling of default and renegotiation (see
Anderson and Sundaresan 1996 or Fan and Sundaresan 2000).
In order to examine the implications of debt renegotiation for the values
of corporate securities and the firm’s default decision, we have to determine
3. To check whether this modeling of default and liquidation is consistent with the available
empirical evidence, we carry out a Monte Carlo simulation. Details are reported in app. A.
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the impact of a successful renegotiation on the cash flows accruing to claim-
holders. This impact depends on the value of the firm’s assets triggering
default, the costs of renegotiation, and the sharing rule for the cash flows from
the firm’s assets during strategic default.
As discussed above, we presume that the firm renegotiates its debt obli-
gations whenever the value of its assets falls below a constant threshold .VB
In particular, we follow Fan and Sundaresan (2000, p. 1062) by considering
that, when the firm is in default, “borrowers stop making the contractual
coupon and start servicing the debt strategically until the firm’s asset value
goes back above the threshold again.” In our framework, we first evaluate
corporate securities for a given renegotiation boundary and then determine
the selected threshold endogenously by maximizing equity value. The sharing
rule for the cash flows from assets in place during default typically results
from a bargaining game between firm claimants. Again, we follow Fan and
Sundaresan (2000) by considering a Nash bargaining game. We denote the
bargaining power of shareholders by h and the bargaining power of bond-
holders by . In contrast to previous models, we also incorporate in our1 h
analysis proportional costs borne by the firm during the renegotiation process,
which we denote by J. This assumption captures the fact that, even though
the costs implied by private workouts generally are low (0.32% of the value
total assets in the study by Gilson, John, and Lang [1990]), Chapter 11 filings
are associated with large costs of financial distress (see Andrade and Kaplan
1998) that may affect shareholders’ default decision.
Using the above set of assumptions, we can determine the allocation of the
renegotiation surplus between firm claimants as follows. Assumption 6 implies
that, if default leads to liquidation, equity is worthless upon default, while
the value of bondholders’ claims is . By contrast, if default leads(1 a) VB
to renegotiation, firm value is equal to and is shared between firmv (V )B
claimants. Denoting the sharing rule for firm value upon default by v, the
incremental value accruing to shareholders is and the incrementalvv (V ) 0B
value to bondholders is .4 Therefore, the sharing(1 v) v (V ) (1 a) VB B
rule for the renegotiation surplus upon default satisfies
∗ h 1hv p arg max [vv(V )] [(1 v)v(V ) (1 a)V ] , (4){ }B B B
the solution to which is
 (1 a)VB∗v p h 1 . (5) 
v(V ) B
4. When the debt contract is renegotiated privately, bondholders are better off not liquidating
the firm whenever . When the firm files Chapter 11, the automatic stay(1 v) v (V ) ≥ (1 a) VB B
of assets prevents bondholders from liquidating the firm’s assets. However, adoption of the
renegotiation plan requires that each participant receive a payoff that exceeds the liquidating
value of its claims. Therefore, bondholders’ payoff has to exceed , which, in turn,(1 a) VB
implies the above specification for the bargaining game.
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The solution to the bargaining game between bondholders and shareholders
can be interpreted as follows. The surplus associated with debt renegotiation
is equal to . Therefore, equation (5) shows that the outcomev (V ) (1 a) VB B
of the renegotiation process allocates this surplus between financial stake-
holders according to their bargaining power. Specifically, shareholders get
∗ ( )v v(V )p h[v V  (1 a)V ], (6)B B B
and bondholders get
∗(1 v )v(V )p (1 h)[v(V ) (1 a)V ] (1 a)V . (7)B B B B
Equation (7) shows that the value of bondholders’ claim upon default is equal
to the liquidation value of the firm ( ) plus a fraction of the(1 a) V (1 h)B
surplus associated with renegotiation. This, in turn, implies that if shareholders
have no bargaining power ( ), bondholders’ claim is equal to firm valuehp 0
upon default. An equally important result is that the surplus shareholders
extract from renegotiation increases with those very parameters that increase
the difference between the ongoing value of the firm and its liquidation value.
In particular, we show below that shareholders’ surplus increases with the
exclusivity period d, liquidation costs a, and the corporate tax rate t and
decreases with costs of financial distress J and the volatility of returns on the
firm’s assets j.
Equations (6) and (7) demonstrate that the value of shareholders’ claim
upon default depends on firm value. Before valuing corporate securities, it
will thus be necessary to determine firm value. Within our model, firm value
is equal to the value of the firm’s unlevered assets plus the present value of
the tax advantage of debt less the present value of costs of financial distress
and liquidation costs. Assumption 1 ensures that there exists a unique prob-
ability measure Q under which the price of any asset, discounted at the riskless
rate, is a martingale (see Harrison and Pliska 1981). Therefore, we can write
firm value as
VBv
ru( )v d, c p du 7 e dV  tc1  JV 1[ ]1 !Q  u V V u V Vu B u B{ }
0
VBrv a e V ,V{ }BQ v
where is the indicator function of the event q.1q
This equation can be interpreted as follows. The first term on the right-
hand side accounts for the cash flows generated by the firm until liquidation.
This term reflects the fact that (i) costs of financial distress are incurred by
the firm whenever it files Chapter 11 (third term in the square brackets) and
(ii) tax benefits are akin to a security that pays a constant coupon as longtc
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as the firm has not declared Chapter 11 (second term).5 By contrast, liquidation
costs are borne only when the firm files Chapter 7 (second term on the right-
hand side).
Solving this equation yields the following result.
Proposition 1. When claimholders take into account the possibility of
Chapter 11 filings, firm value satisfies for a given default threshold :VB
y
tc J tc V
v(d, c)p V  (dA(d) C(d))V  aV C(d) B(d) , (8)B B[ ]( )r d r VB
with , , and . In equa-2 2bp (1/j) (r d j /2) lp 2r b yp (1/j) (b l)
tion (8), we have
1 1 1 F(l d)
A(d)p  ,[ ]l l b j l b j F(l d)
l b l bF(l d)
B(d)p  ,2l 2l F(l d)
F(jb) d[ ]
C(d)p ,F(l d)
and
2x
F(x)p 1 x 2p exp N(x),( )2
with the standard normal cumulative distribution function.N
Proof of proposition 1. See appendix B.
The next step is to solve for the equity and debt values. For doing so, it
is necessary to determine the impact of Chapter 11 filings on the cash flows
accruing to claimholders. The above discussion shows that, within the present
model, Chapter 11 filings affect the payoffs accruing to bondholders in two
ways. First, Chapter 11 filings change the average liquidation time and firm
value upon liquidation. In particular, the payoff accruing to bondholders upon
liquidation (i.e., to be received at time ) is . Second, bondholdersVBv (1 a) V VBv
lose part of the interest payments each time the firm files for Chapter 11.
Specifically, if we denote by the strategic debt service when the firm iss (V)t
in Chapter 11, coupon payments are defined at any time u, , byVB0 ≤ u ≤ v
c1  s(V )1 ,1 !V V u V Vu B u B
5. The treatment of the tax benefits of debt in default is complex and usually very idiosyncratic.
The appendix in Gilson (1997) provides a detailed discussion of the general case. We follow
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) by presuming that the firm does not benefit from the tax shield in
bankruptcy. This choice of modeling allows for a direct comparison of our results with theirs.
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whereas dividend payments are defined by
dV  (1 t)c 1  (dJ)V  s(V ) 1 .[ ] [ ]1 !u V V u u V Vu B u B
The payoffs to shareholders in and outside bankruptcy allow for a deter-
mination of the values of corporate securities. In particular, when claimholders
anticipate the possibility of Chapter 11 filings, the values of corporate debt
and equity are given by
VBv
ru( )D d, c p du 7 e c1  s(V )1[ ]1 !Q  V V u V Vu B u B{ }
0
VBrv (1 a) e V ,V[ ]BQ v
and
v
ruE(d, c)p  du 7 e dV  (1 t)c 1[ ]{ 1 u V Vu B(
0
 [(d J)V  s(V )]1 .}!u u V Vu B )
In order to solve these equations and determine the values of corporate
securities, we proceed as follows. The value of equity can be written as the
value of the perpetual stream to the current flow of income ( )dV  (1 t) cu
plus the option to default on the firm’s debt obligation. This implies that,
using the strong Markov property of Brownian motion, we can write equity
value as
(1 t)c
yE(d, c)p V  aV , (9)
r
where a is a constant and the first two terms on the right-hand side represent
the unlimited liability value of equity. Consider now the value of the option
to default. The sharing rule for the surplus upon default implies that the value
of equity at the default time satisfies
E(V ) d p h v(V ) d  (1 a)V , (10)[ ]VpV VpV BB B
where firm value is given by equation (8). Combining equations (9) and (10)
gives the value of equity for a given default threshold . The value ofVB
corporate debt is then given by
D(V )p v(V ) E(V ).
Solving these equations leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When claimholders take into account the possibility of
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Chapter 11 filings, the values of corporate debt and equity satisfy for a given
default threshold VB
y y 
c V V( )D d, c p 1  (1 a)V  B( ) ( )r V V B B
y
V( ) ( ) 1 h R d , (11)( )VB
and
y y V (1 t)c V( )E d, c pV V  1 B( ) ( )V r V B B
y
V( ) hR d , (12)( )VB
where the renegotiation surplus at the time of default satisfiesR (d)
J tc
R(d)p aV (1 C(d)) (dA(d) C(d))V  (1 B(d)),B B
d r
and the factors , , and are defined in proposition 1.A (d) B (d) C (d)
The closed-form expressions reported in proposition 2 for the values of
corporate debt and equity can be interpreted as follows. The values of corporate
debt and equity are equal to a perpetual entitlement to the current flow of
income (respectively given by c and ) plus the change in valuesdV (1 t) ct
occurring in default. Because this change in values occurs if and when the
firm defaults on its debt obligations, it has to be weighted by the Arrow
Debreu price of this event ( ).y(V/V )B
It is noteworthy that these expressions extend those obtained by Leland
(1994) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000) to incorporate the possibility of a
positive but finite maximum period of renegotiation. Indeed, when ordp 0
, equations (11) and (12) reduce to equations (7) and (13) in Lelandhp 0
(1994). These equations hold for situations in which (i) default leads to an
immediate liquidation of the firm’s assets or (ii) shareholders have no bar-
gaining power and hence do not extract any surplus from renegotiation. When
and renegotiation is costless ( ), equations (11) and (12) ared r  Jp 0
similar to those provided by Fan and Sundaresan (2000) where default never
leads to liquidation.
Within our framework, we can also derive the probability of liquidation.
This probability is given in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3. The probability of liquidation obeysP (d)L
2 21[2(md)/j ] mdj /2F  d( )V jP(d)p , (13)L 2( ) mdj /2VB F d( )
j
where stands for the mean total return on the firm’s assets under2m 1 d j /2
the physical probability measure and equals the product of the physicalP (d)L
probability of default and the physical probability of liquidation, given default.
Proof of proposition 3. See appendix B.
The expression reported in proposition 3 for the liquidation probability
again generalizes those of Leland (1994) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000) to
account for a strictly positive but finite maximum period of renegotiation.
Indeed, when , we have , and this probability reduces to thedp 0 F (0)p 1
probability that the process (1) ever reaches in the future. WhenV d r B
, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (13) tends to zero, and
so does the probability of liquidation.
III. Applications and Analysis
We now turn to the implications of the model for the decision to default,
credit spreads, and optimal leverage. While most of the results are derived
analytically, part of the analysis relies on numerical examples. Input parameter
values for these numerical simulations are set as follows:6 the initial value of
the firm’s assets, ; the riskless interest rate, ; the net taxVp 100 rp 6%
advantage of debt, ; liquidation costs, ; costs of financialtp 20% ap 40%
distress, ; the constant payout rate, ; the exclusivity period,Jp 3% dp 5%
; and the mean total rate of return on V, . For each simulation,dp 2 mp 13.5%
the coupon is set so as to maximize equity value at the time of debt issuance.
In addition, we consider that the bargaining power is balanced equally between
firm claimants, that is, .hp 0.5
A. The Timing of Default
When the decision to default is endogenous, the timing of default depends
on the default threshold selected by shareholders. This default threshold can
6. These parameters roughly reflect a typical Standard & Poor’s 500 firm. The net tax ad-
vantage of debt takes into account the corporate tax rate, the personal tax rate on equity income,
and the tax rate on bond income. Liquidation costs are defined as the firm’s going concern value
minus its liquidation value, divided by its going concern value. Using this definition, Alderson
and Betker (1995) and Gilson (1997) report liquidation costs equal to 36.5% and 45.5% for the
median firm in their samples. Costs of financial distress lie between 3% and 7.5% of firm value
1 year before bankruptcy in the empirical studies by Warner (1977), Weiss (1990), or Betker
(1997). The average time period between the indication of financial distress and its resolution
is between 2 and 3 years for firms that renegotiate their claims under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (see Franks and Torous 1989; Gilson 1997; or Helwege 1999). Also, Weiss
and Wruck (1998) report that Eastern Airlines remained almost 2 years in Chapter 11 before
filing Chapter 7.
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be determined by characterizing the default policy that maximizes equity value.
Using equation (12), we get the following result.
Proposition 4. When claimholders take into account the possibility of
Chapter 11 filings, the default threshold selected by shareholders is given by
y c[1 t ht(1 B(d))]
V p . (14)JB
y 1 r rh[a(1 C(d)) (dA(d) C(d))]
d
Proof of proposition 4. See appendix B.
The expression provided in proposition 4 for the default threshold extends
those obtained by Leland (1994) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000) to incorporate
the possibility of Chapter 11 filings. Indeed, when default leads to an im-
mediate liquidation, we have and equation (14) reduces to equationdp 0
(14) in Leland:
y c(1 t)V (d)p .B
y 1 r
This equation reveals that, if default leads to liquidation, it is optimal for
shareholders to default when equity is worthless and the default threshold
does not (directly) depend on bankruptcy costs.
When default never leads to liquidation and renegotiation is costless, we
have and . Equation (14) then reduces to the expression deter-d r  Jp 0
mined by Fan and Sundaresan (2000) for private workouts:
y c(1 t ht)V ()p ,B
y 1 r(1 ha)
where . More generally, proposition 4 reveals that theV (){ lim V (d)B dr B
default threshold should depend on the maximum length of the renegotiation
process, d. This result is not surprising since this parameter reflects the extent
to which claimants can bargain over firm value.
The closed-form expression of the default threshold reported in proposition
4 allows us to compare the default threshold associated with Chapter 11 filings
with those associated with private workouts or Chapter 7 filings. Specifically,
using the inequalities
0 ≤ ht[1 B(d)] ≤ ht,
and
J
r(1 ha) ≤ r 1 h a(1 C(d)) (dA(d) C(d)) ≤ r,[ ]{ }d
we immediately get the following result.
Proposition 5. The default threshold selected by shareholders satisfies
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for any and :d ≥ 0 c ≥ 0
V (0) ≤ V (d) ≤ V ().B B B
In addition, a sufficient condition for the threshold to be lower thanV (d)B
the liquidity threshold isc/d
d ≤ r(1 ha).
Proposition 5 characterizes the default policy that maximizes equity value
for a given—exogenous—debt level c. Specifically, this proposition reveals
that the default threshold associated with private workouts ( ) is greaterV ()B
than the default threshold associated with Chapter 11 filings ( ), whichV (d)B
in turn is greater than the default threshold associated with Chapter 7 filings
( ). If default leads to liquidation, the decision to default is irreversibleV (0)B
and it is optimal for shareholders to default when equity is worthless. When
it is possible to renegotiate the debt contract, the decision to default no longer
is irreversible and shareholders have incentives to default earlier in order to
extract concessions from bondholders. Because the liquidation probability
decreases with the length of the observation period, the shareholders’ incen-
tives to default early increase with d, inducing a negative relation between
the anticipated length of the observation period and the default threshold .7VB
An additional implication of proposition 5 is that, for most input parameter
values, the borrower will default on its debt obligations in the region where
the firm is cash constrained ( ). This implies that equity will be issuedV ! c/dB
to finance the contractual coupon during this period when V belongs to the
interval . To explore the determinants of the region of asset values[V , c/d]B
where the firm is cash constrained, we can examine the impact of the input
parameter values on its relative size defined by
J
r rh[a(1 C(d)) (dA(d) C(d))]c/d y 1
d{ . (15)
V y d[1 t ht(1 B(d))]B
This expression reveals that the relative size of the interval decreases[V , c/d]B
with those very parameters that increase shareholders’ incentives to default
early. In other words, the relative size of this interval (i) decreases with
liquidation costs a, the length of the renegotiation process d, and shareholders’
7. While we do not address explicitly the choice between private workouts and Chapter 11
in this article, the above argument suggests that firms that renegotiate their debt privately will
tend to have a higher going-concern value at the time of default. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990)
find, in a sample of 169 financially distressed companies, that firm value at the time of default
is related to the choice between private vs. legally supervised renegotiation. In particular, they
document that firms with relatively high going-concern value are more likely to restructure
privately. Our predictions are consistent with their results. However, our model suggests that the
observed correlation is explained by the reverse causality. If shareholders have rational expec-
tations, they anticipate the way financial distress will be resolved (see Gilson et al. [1990] for
empirical evidence) and thus revise the default threshold accordingly.
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TABLE 1 Comparative Statics of the Model
Scenario/
Exclusivity
Period
Leverage
Ratio
Default
Threshold
Liquidation
Probability
Credit
Spread
Base case:
dp 0 56.80 34.66 3.20 102
dp 3 62.88 47.48 2.14 140
dp 5 63.83 49.34 1.59 146
:jp 15%
dp 0 62.66 42.56 .36 65
dp 3 64.96 53.20 .18 84
dp 5 65.50 55.59 .11 88
:rp 7%
dp 0 59.96 38.85 4.63 93
dp 3 65.08 53.10 3.09 133
dp 5 66.03 55.26 2.30 140
:ap 50%
dp 0 53.34 32.09 2.49 96
dp 3 58.18 44.77 1.77 132
dp 5 59.22 46.98 1.36 139
:Jp 1%
dp 0 56.80 34.66 3.20 102
dp 3 64.47 51.10 2.72 152
dp 5 66.29 54.99 2.26 166
Note.—Reported are the optimal leverage ratio (in %), the optimal default threshold, the probability of
liquidation (in %), and the credit spread (in basis points). Parameters for the base case are the riskless interest
rate , the firm’s payout rate , the volatility of the firm’s assets , the tax advantage ofrp 6% dp 5% jp 20%
debt liquidation costs , costs of financial distress: , shareholders’ bargaining powertp 20%, ap 40% Jp 3%
, and the mean total rate of return on the firm’s assets . The value of the firm’s underlyinghp 0.5 mp 13.5%
assets is , and the default level is determined endogenously. We examine deviations from the baseVp 100 VB
case by respectively setting , , , and .jp 15% rp 7% ap 50% Jp 1%
bargaining power h, and (ii) increases with the corporate tax rate and costs
of financial distress J. Equation (15) also shows that the size of this region
of asset values where the firm is cash constrained depends on the volatility
of returns on assets in place, the firm’s dividend yield, and the risk-free rate.
In particular, because more volatility implies a greater value for the option of
waiting to default, additional volatility increases the relative size of the region
where the firm issues equity to finance the contractual coupon.
Additional implications concerning the behavior of the default threshold at
optimal leverage are reported in table 1. As shown in this table, the default
threshold, and thus equity value at the time of default, increases with the
corporate tax rate t and decreases with shareholders’ bargaining power h,
liquidation costs a, costs of financial distress J, firm risk j, and the total
payout rate to claimholders d. It is noteworthy that some of these effects go
in the opposite direction to that predicted by equation (14) for a given coupon
payment. In other words, these effects are essentially driven by the impact of
these very parameters on optimal leverage, as we now illustrate.
B. Optimal Leverage
Before turning to the analysis of leverage decisions, it is important to make
a clear distinction between the value of equity ex ante—at the time of debt
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issuance—and ex post—after debt has been issued. The value of equity ex
post is given by the present value of the cash flows accruing to shareholders
after the debt has been sold (see eq. [12]). The value of equity ex ante is
given by the sum of the value of equity ex post and the market value of debt
at the time it is issued. As a result, although the default threshold typically
is selected ex post to maximize equity value, optimal leverage is determined
ex ante to maximize firm value.
Within the present model, investment policy is fixed and capital structure
decisions result from a trade-off between the tax advantage of debt and bank-
ruptcy costs. Optimal leverage is defined by
∗D(d, c )∗L(d, c )p ,∗v(d, c )
where is the value-maximizing coupon payment. The following proposition∗c
relates this coupon payment to the various parameters of the model.
Proposition 6. When claimholders take into account the possibility of
Chapter 11 filings, the value-maximizing coupon payment satisfies
1/y
r J∗ y y1c p V (y 1) B(d)b  b aC(d) (dA(d) C(d)) , (16)( { [ ]})t d
where
y 1 t ht(1 B(d))
bp .J
y 1 r rh[a(1 C(d)) (dA(d) C(d))]
d
Equation (16) reveals that the bargaining power of shareholders h, liqui-
dation costs a, the corporate tax rate t, and costs of financial distress J affect
the value-maximizing coupon payment. In particular, leverage should increase
with corporate tax rate t (the benefit of debt) and decrease with liquidation
costs a and costs of financial distress J (the costs of debt). In addition, the
larger the bargaining power of shareholders, the greater the cost of debt and
hence the lower optimal leverage. These effects are illustrated in table 1 and
in figure 2c, which report the firm’s leverage choices in different economic
environments.
While it is not possible to determine analytically the impact of debt re-
negotiation on the debt level selected by shareholders, it is clear from equation
(16) that optimal leverage depends on the exclusivity period. In other words,
one of the predictions of the present model is that the treatment of claimholders
in default has an impact on the capital structure selected ex ante by firms.
Figure 2 plots optimal leverage, credit spreads, and the selected default thresh-
old as a function of the exclusivity period for different levels of shareholders’
bargaining power. In this figure, we consider three different scenarios: a take-
it-or-leave-it offer by bondholders ( ), a take-it-or-leave-it offer by share-hp 0
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Fig. 2.—Shareholders’ bargaining power and corporate debt. Parts a, b, and c plot,
respectively, the equilibrium default threshold, credit spreads (in basis points), and
optimal leverage as a function of the exclusivity period for various shareholders’
bargaining powers. Parameters are set as in the base case. Shareholders’ bargaining
power is (long-dashed line), (short-dashed line), and (thin line).hp 0 hp .5 hp 1
holders ( ), and a game where the bargaining power is balanced equallyhp 1
between firm claimants ( ).hp 0.5
In our base case, optimal leverage is roughly 57% when liquidation im-
mediately follows default. Allowing for renegotiation affects optimal leverage,
either increasing it or decreasing it, as figure 2c illustrates. Allowing for
renegotiation after default reduces the present value of liquidation costs. On
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the other hand, every observation period is associated with costs of financial
distress and tax shield reductions that make debt less attractive. Figure 2c
shows that the impact of these two effects on optimal leverage strongly de-
pends on shareholders’ bargaining power. If debtors have most of the bar-
gaining power, the first effect dominates and leverage decreases as the con-
straints put on the renegotiation process decrease. By contrast, if creditors
have most of the bargaining power, the second effect dominates and leverage
increases with the length of the exclusivity period. Overall, the analysis sug-
gests that the bargaining power of claimholders in default has a large impact
on ex ante leverage choices. It also shows that bankruptcy procedures may
help explain the wide variety of debt levels observed in practice.
C. Credit Spreads
For any promised coupon payment c, credit spreads on corporate debt are
defined by
c
y(d, c)p  r.
D(d, c)
While this equation can be solved in closed form, the analytical expression
of the credit spreads is complex and does not provide any economic intuition.
Therefore, we do not report this expression here and instead base the analysis
of credit spreads on numerical examples. Before proceeding to this analysis,
it should be noted that the level of credit spreads generated by our model is
consistent with observed quantities. Using input parameter values that are in
line with U.S. current economic conditions, table 1 reports credit spreads
ranging from 65 to 166 basis points. On the empirical side, Duffee (1998),
for instance, reports credit spreads between 67 and 184 basis points on a
sample of 2,814 noncallable bonds quoted from 1985 to 1995.
Let us now turn to analyzing the determinants of the levels of credit spreads.
Consider first the impact of the exclusivity period on credit spreads. Figure
2b indicates that credit spreads increase with the length of the exclusivity
period. Within the present model, the possibility to file for Chapter 11 has
two major effects on credit spreads. First, the probability of liquidation de-
creases with d. Liquidation costs, which are at the expense of creditors (ex
post), are therefore less imminent. Second, Chapter 11 filings involve obser-
vation periods during which the debt service is potentially reduced. Simu-
lations results indicate that the second effect dominates at optimal leverage
so that credit spreads increase with d.
Consider next the impact of shareholders’ bargaining power. Interestingly,
figure 2b shows that credit spreads at optimal leverage display little sensitivity
to the allocation of bargaining power between claimholders. This result arises
within the present model because of two distinct effects of this sharing rule
on credit spreads. First, the default threshold selected by shareholders de-
creases with h (see fig. 2a). Second, shareholders’ bargaining power increases
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the cost of debt and thus makes debt less attractive (see fig. 2c). These two
effects partially offset each other and make credit spreads vary only by a few
basis points when h changes. This behavior of credit spreads sharply contrasts
with that of leverage (see fig. 2c): in our model, a change in claimholders’
balance of power significantly affects leverage ratios but has a very limited
impact on credit spreads.
Finally, data in table 1 also reveal that credit spreads are negatively cor-
related with the riskless interest rate, which is now a well-documented behavior
of corporate bonds. In addition, credit spreads are decreasing with liquidation
costs at optimal leverage. This result arises because higher liquidation costs
induce shareholders to lower the optimal coupon, which in turn reduces the
default threshold. These two effects combined decrease the riskiness of debt.
Other standard comparative statics apply, and so we do not report them.
IV. Conclusion
This article presents a contingent claims model that captures some of the
fundamental features of Chapter 11 and investigates their impact on corporate
financing decisions. In our setting, Chapter 11 filings allow shareholders to
benefit from the automatic stay of assets during a fixed period of time granted
by the court. Defaulting on the debt contract implies costs of financial distress
to be paid during the observation period. In return, it avoids immediate li-
quidation and redefines the payoffs that, respectively, accrue to both share-
holders and bondholders. In this context, the decision to default depends on
the degree of protection offered to shareholders by Chapter 11 pondered by
the inevitable costs of financial distress.
The model shows that the possibility to file for Chapter 11 and to renegotiate
debt contracts has an unambiguous effect on both shareholders’ default in-
centives and credit spreads. Specifically, debt renegotiation encourages early
default and increases credit spreads on corporate debt. By contrast, the impact
of debt renegotiation on firms’ leverage choices is ambiguous. In particular,
the model shows that, when debtors (creditors) have most of the bargaining
power, we can expect leverage to decrease (increase) with the constraints put
on the renegotiation process. The analysis in this article also reveals that the
quantitative impact of claimholders’ bargaining power on corporate financing
decisions is important. By contrast, credit spreads on corporate debt show
little sensitivity to this very parameter. Finally, although simulations have
been calibrated with respect to U.S. estimates for Chapter 11 modeling, our
framework is flexible enough to capture other bankruptcy procedures that
involve observation periods with the automatic stay of assets.
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TABLE A1 Monte Carlo Simulations for Chapter 11 Filings and Liquidation
Results for Defaulting Firms Not Liquidated
Time
Step
Firms
That
Defaulted
Firms Sorted by Number of Times They Defaulted
1 2 3 4 ≥ 5
1/6 1,810 878 486 242 119 85
(100) (48.5) (26.8) (13.4) (6.6) (4.7)
1/12 2,180 811 540 350 211 268
(100) (37.2) (24.8) (16.0) (9.7) (12.3)
1/24 2,469 648 540 373 292 616
(100) (26.2) (21.9) (15.1) (11.8) (25.0)
1/52 2,727 474 406 395 298 1,154
(100) (17.4) (14.9) (14.5) (10.9) (42.3)
Note.—The numbers in parentheses represent the ratio of the number of firms that defaulted 1, 2, 3, 4, and
5 or more times to the total number of firms that defaulted over the 10-year period.
Appendix A
Monte Carlo Simulations
To generate firm value sample paths, the base case parameters (see the discussion in
Sec. III) are used: , , , and . Other parametersVp 100 mp 13.5% dp 5% jp 20%
are , , , , , and The optimal defaultdp 2 rp 6% ap 40% Jp 3% tp 20% hp 0.5.
threshold is . To choose the appropriate time step, we first remark thatV p 45.8891B
bankruptcy can only be declared with the board’s approval. In a sample of 1,382
observations for 307 firms over the years 1990–94 (or 90.1% of the maximum possible
observations in a sample of the 350 largest firms that are listed in the Forbes com-
pensation survey for 1992), Vafeas (1999) documents that board meeting frequency
was seven times a year on average and exceeded 20 times a year for only one firm.
In addition, Vafeas finds that board meeting frequency increases as firm value dete-
riorates. We therefore report simulations with time steps ranging from weekly (52
times a year) to two-monthly observations (six times a year). For every simulation,
we have generated 100,000 paths over a 10-year period.
Results are summarized in tables A1 and A2. Table A1 gives the number of firms
(among the 100,000) that experienced one or several Chapter 11 filings without being
liquidated at the end of the 10-year period (i.e., firms for which the process reachedVt
the default barrier at least once over the 10-year period). For instance, with a monthly
time step, we find that 2,180 firms defaulted over the 10-year period without being
liquidated. In addition, this table sorts this total number of nonliquidated defaulting
firms into five subsets according to the number of times the firm defaulted. For instance,
in this subsample of 2,180 firms, 540 defaulted twice without being liquidated. Table
A2 reports similar statistics for firms that experienced one or several Chapter 11 filings
with the last one leading to liquidation.
Observe that the simulated liquidation rate of defaulting firms is robust across various
time steps (between 13.9% and 15.3%) and is in line with the rates reported in the
empirical literature. Also, while repeated Chapter 11 filings are a bit numerous for
some board meeting frequencies we have selected, they remain reasonably limited.
For example, with a monthly time step, among the 2,533 firms that defaulted at least
once in 10 years, 1,986 firms (78%) have had less than four filings.
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TABLE A2 Monte Carlo Simulations for Chapter 11 Filings and Liquidation
Results for Defaulting Firms Liquidated
Firms Sorted by Number of Times They Defaulted
Time Step Firms Liquidated 1 2 3 4 ≥ 5
1/6 326 151 100 51 14 10
(100) (46.3) (30.7) (15.6) (4.3) (3.1)
1/12 353 110 105 70 28 40
(100) (31.2) (29.8) (19.8) (7.9) (11.3)
1/24 402 117 82 63 49 91
(100) (29.1) (20.4) (15.7) (12.2) (22.6)
1/52 466 91 87 66 52 170
(100) (19.5) (18.7) (14.2) (11.1) (36.5)
Note.—The numbers in parentheses represent the ratio of the number of liquidated firms that defaulted 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5 or more times before being liquidated to the total number of liquidated firms.
Appendix B
Proofs of Propositions 1, 3, and 4
Proof of proposition 1. Firm value is given by
VBv
ruv(d, c)p  du 7 e dV  tc1 JV 1[ ]1 !Q  u V V u V Vu B u B{ }
0
VBrv a e V .V{ }BQ v
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation can be decomposed as follows
VBv
ru du 7 e dV 1 1Q  u V Vu B{ }
0
VBv
ru  du 7 e tc1  (dJ)V 1 .[ ]1 !Q  V V u V Vu B u B{ }
0
Writing with and yields2Z pW  bu bp (r d j /2) /j ap (1/j) ln (V /V ) ! 0u u B
V aBv v
ru jZ ruu du 7 e V 1 p  du 7Ve 1 e .b1 1Q  u V V Q  W au B u{ } { }
0 0
Note that since the firm is not in default at the initial date. Applying the Girsanova ! 0
theorem with the density
dQ 2bZ (b /2)ttGt ≥ 0, p e ,FdP Ft
we get
 
2 2(jb)Z (l /2)u (jb)Z (l /2)uu uV du 7 e e 1  V du 7 e e 1 ,b1 1{ } { }P  Z a P  W au u
a0 v
where and is a standard Brownian motion under P. Let us now2lp 2r b (Z )t t≥0
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rely on the following lemma (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve [1991, p. 272], for a
derivation).
Lemma 1. If is a piecewise continuous function withJ :  r 

FyF 2aF Fdy J(x y) e ! ; Gx 

for some constant and is a standard Brownian motion, the resolventa 1 0 (W , t ≥ 0)t
operator of Brownian motion is defined byK (J)a
 1
at FyF 2aK (J)p  dt 7 e J(W ) p dy 7J(y)e .a  t { } 2a0 
Using lemma 1, we can write the first integral as
  12(jb)Z (l /2)u FyFl (jb)yu du 7 e e 1 p dy e e .1P  Z a u{ } l0 a
After simplifications, we finally obtain, with ,yp (b l) /j
y
dV VB(jb)Z luu du 7 dVe e 1 p V .1P  Z a 2u{ } ( )l  (j b)l V0 B
Thanks to the equality in law between and for two independenta 0 av (Z) v (Z) T (Z)
copies and the independence of and , we can writea 0T (Z) v (Z)

2(jb)Z (l /2)uu du 7Ve e 1 1P  Z au{ }
av

2 a 2(l /2)T (Z ) (jb)(Z a) (l /2)uu up V e du 7 e e 1 1P  Z 0u{ }
0v

2 0 20(jb)aFaFl (l /2)v (jb)Z (l /2)uuvp Ve  e du 7 e e 1 .01P  Z 0uv{ }
0
In order to solve this equation, we will use the following lemma due to Chesney,
Jeanblanc, and Yor (1997).
Lemma 2. If is a Brownian motion starting from zero, the Laplace transform(W )t t≥0
of the first time a negative Brownian excursion lasts more than d is
0 Gg ≥ 0,  [exp (gv (W ))]p 1/F 2gd ,( )Q
where
2 2 z xF (x)p z exp (zx ) dzp 1 2px exp ( )N (x) .∫0 2 2
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Using lemma 2 and the distribution of (see Chesney et al. 1997), we haveZ 0v

2(jb)Z (l /2)uu duVe e 1 1P  Z au{ }
av
yV (V /V ) 2B B (jb)x (jb)Z (l /2)uup P(Z  dx)e  du 7 e e 10 1{ } v P  Z xu F(l d)  0
y1 
V V x 12B (jb)xx /2d (jbl)yp dx e dy e ( ) V  d lF( 2ld)  x
y F(l d)V V 1B
p .( ) l V l j bF(l d)B
This last result completes the computation of the first expectation.
Consider next the term
VBv
ru(dJ) du 7 e V 1 .!Q  u V Vu B{ }
0
This term can be decomposed into
V VB Bv v
ru ru du 7 e V   du 7 e V 1 .1Q  u Q  u V Vu B{ } { }
0 0
Using the same line of reasoning as in the previous calculation, it is then easy to show
that
yVBv  F((j b) d)1 V
ru du 7 e V p V V . Q  u B{ } ( )d VF(l d) 0 B
Then the last term satisfies
yVBv  F(l d)l b l b V
ru du 7 e 1 p 1  . 1Q  V Vu B{ } ( )2l 2l VF(l d) 0 B
Finally, the liquidation value of the firm is given by
arv(1a) e V .a[ ]Q v
Applying the Cameron-Martin-Girsanov theorem using the Radon-Nykodim density
defined above, we get
a 2 arv ba (rb /2)v (jb)m d1 e V p V  e e e ,a[ ] [ ]Q v B P
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where is the Brownian meander taken at time 1.8 Under P, the meander andm m1 1
are independent. Hence, using lemma 2, the equality in law between anda av v (Z)
, the independence of and , and the law of the Brownian0 a a 0v (Z) T (Z) T (Z) v (Z)
meander, we get
y
F((b j) d)Varv e V p V .a[ ]Q v B( ) V F(l d)B
Proof of proposition 3. The Laplace transform of the liquidation time is given
by
a a exp (gv (Z)) p  exp (gv (Z)) 7 1 .a[ ] [ ]!v (Z) 
Therefore, the probability of liquidation, , satisfiesPL
gr0
a aP(d)p P(v (Z) ! )p lim[exp (gv (Z))].L
Applying lemma 2, we get, with and 2ap (1/j) ln (V /V ) bp (1/j)[m d (j /2)] 1B
,0
F(b d)
P(d)p exp (2ab) .L F(b d)
Proof of proposition 4. The default threshold selected by shareholders is the one
that maximizes equity value
y y V (1 t)c V
E(d, c)p VV  1 B( ) ( )V r V B B
y
J tc V 
 h aV (1C(d)) (dA(d)C(d))V  (1B(d)) . B B ( )d r V  B
The first-order condition with respect to givesVB
y y10p(y 1)aV  ybV ,B B
with
J
yap V 1 h a(1C(d)) (dA(d)C(d)) ,{ [ ]}
d
[1 t ht(1B(d))]c
ybp V .
r
The solution to this equation is reported in proposition 2. The second-order condition
8. If we fix a real number t, the Brownian meander is the process
1
m p FW F, 1 ≥ u ≥ 0 .u gu(tg )( )t tt gt
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gives
y1 y2 y2y(y 1)aV  ybV  ybV ≤ 0.[ ]B B B
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the first-order condition and is
equal to zero. The second term is negative if , which is immediate for andb ≥ 0 t ≤ 1
.h ≥ 0
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